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Abstract. Security of a modern block cipher is commonly measured
in terms of its resistance to known attacks. While the provable security
approach to block ciphers dates back to the first CRYPTO conference
(1981), analysis of modern block cipher proposals typically do not ben-
efit fully from this besides the proof of security for DESX by Kilian and
Rogaway, and recent work on the notions of PRP-RKA initiated by Bel-
lare and Kohno. We consider the security of recently proposed PRP-RKA
secure block ciphers. We discuss implications of the proven theorems and
how they relate to existing types of attacks on block ciphers. Our results
are the first known cryptanalysis of these provably secure ciphers.
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1 Introduction
The right approach to analyzing the security of public-key encryption schemes
and protocols is by reduction to an underlying hard problem, so called the prov-
able security approach. In the symmetric-key setting, while provable security
results do exist e.g. Luby and Rackoff, security of a modern block cipher is of-
ten gauged by its resistance to known attacks. Thus, from the perspective of
the provable security community, a block cipher’s security may seem heuristic.
However, in the context of symmetric encryption schemes where the plaintext is
of arbitrary length, security is indeed shown by the reduction approach e.g. see
the NIST recommended modes which all come with this kind of proof.
This paper considers the formal provable security approach to analyzing block
ciphers. The advantage is clear. Security of a block cipher can be proven in the
generic sense, by specifying bounds on the adversary’s resources, without assum-
ing the type of approach taken by an adversary. It captures all possible attacks
mountable by the adversary given those resources. This compares favourably to
the heuristic case where a primitive is designed to resist some list of attacks but
may later fall to attacks not considered by the designer. Historically, building
on work by Luby and Rackoff, the provable security of block ciphers have been
performed with respect to the notion of pseudorandomness (PRP). This is ad-
vantageous since PRP implies security against key-recovery attacks. Except for
[7, 1, 9, 10, 8], we are however not aware of any work that analyzes the security
of modern block ciphers in the context of PRP; although the assumption that a
block cipher is PRP was used in the security of CBC-MAC.
Background. To the best of our knowledge, the earliest provable security anal-
ysis of block ciphers is by Hellman et al. [4] where it was shown that any general
cryptanalytic attack is equivalent to exhaustive key search. In particular, the
security notion was defined in the ideal cipher model (a.k.a. Shannon model or
black box model) and in terms of the adversary winning a key-recovery game.
We denote this as the KR game. Meanwhile, formalizing the security of block
ciphers against related-key attacks in fact dates back to the work of Winternitz
and Hellman [13] where it was also considered in the context of a key-recovery
game in the ideal cipher model, but here the adversary has access to related-key
oracles. We denote this as the KR-RKA game. The first known block cipher with
a provable security proof of pseudorandomness (PRP) is DESX [7]. The proof
took key-recovery attacks into account. To be precise, it was shown that for a
k + 2n-bit key K = 〈K1,K2,K3〉 where K1,K3 ∈ {0, 1}
n and K2 ∈ {0, 1}
k, the
PRP advantage of an adversary A against DESX is upper bounded as
AdvPRPDESX(A) ≤
2mt
2k+n
,
wherem is the number of chosen plaintext-ciphertext queries and t is the number
of computations of the underlying block cipher E. Note that the ideal cipher
model allows the adversary unbounded [4, 7] computational resources.
A provable security proof guarantees nothing more than what it claims. We
will see that in the context of the PRP-RKA proofs of the block ciphers in [1, 9,
8], pseudorandomness of a given PRP-RKA block cipher E′ is only claimed up to
the pseudorandomness (PRP) of the underlying block cipher E. This is in fact a
minimalist requirement, since it basically says that at the worst case, the security
(with respect to pseudorandomness) of E′ should be at least the security of the
underlying E. To be precise, the proofs are not meant to say anything about the
security of E′ against key-recovery attacks although it is often expected that if
a cipher is PRP secure it should also be KR secure [7].
Since the bulk of block cipher analysis is dedicated to key-recovery attacks,
it is sensible to formally cast these PRP-RKA ciphers also in the context of
resistance to key-recovery attacks when related-key oracles are either available
(KR-RKA) or not available (KR). Interestingly, doing so brings us back to where
it started, since the first results [4, 13] on provable security of block ciphers were
in the context of KR and KR-RKA.
Our results. We first revisit the security notions of KR and KR-RKA and
discuss how key-recovery attacks can be captured in both KR and PRP types of
notions. In fact, in this sense both types of notions only differ in the winning goal
of the adversary. We demonstrate both non-related-key and related-key attacks
on the Bellare-Kohno block cipher, and a non-related-key attack on the Kim et
al. cipher. All attacks are less than exhaustive key search over the entire key.
Our results are the first known cryptanalysis of PRP-RKA ciphers. To be fair, our
attacks do not contradict the security proofs of these ciphers for two reasons.
First, the proofs consider the pseudorandomness of a cipher and do not take
key-recovery attacks into account. Second, and more importantly, the proofs
are minimalist in the sense that they treat the worst case scenario where E′ is
expected to be at least as secure as the underlying E, otherwise constructing E′
from E gives an even weaker cipher than E itself. In the ideal case, we would
require something more, i.e. the security of E′ should substantially be higher
than E. That our results do not contradict the security proofs does not mean our
attacks are actually captured by the proofs. Instead, the security proofs do not
explicitly capture key-recovery attacks, so our results are incomparable to what
is claimed by the proofs. They do however underline that security reductions do
not make a scheme secure per se.
2 Definitions
Consider a family of functions F : K × D → R where K = {0, 1}k is the set
of keys of F , D = {0, 1}l is the domain of F and R = {0, 1}L is the range of
F , where k, l and L are the key, input and output lengths in bits. FK(D) is
shorthand for F (K,D). By K
$
← K, we denote randomly selecting a string, K
from K. Similar notations apply for a family of permutations E : K × D → D
where K = {0, 1}k is the set of keys of E and D = {0, 1}l is the domain and range
of E. The related-key-deriving (RKD) function φ ∈ Φ is a map φ : K → K, where
Φ is a subset of functions mapping K to K. Given F and K ∈ K, the related-key
oracle FRK(K,·)(·) takes two arguments: a function φ : K → K and an element
P ∈ D, and returns Fφ(K)(P ); where RK(K,φ) = φ(K). An attack exploiting
access to the oracle FRK(K,φ)(·) where φ ∈ Φ is a Φ-restricted related-key attack
(RKA). Similar definitions apply for E.
2.1 Notions of PRP(-RKA) and KR(-RKA)
For a family of permutations E on D, a PRP adversary A gets oracle access to
function g, which is a random permutation on D or a random instance of cipher
EK ; A’s advantage in telling between the two, over randomly guessing:
AdvPRPE (A) =| Pr[K
$
← K : AEK(·) = 1]
− Pr[K
$
← K : G
$
← Perm(D) : AGK(·) = 1] | .
E is PRP-secure if AdvPRPE (A) is negligible.
Extension of this to include RKAs allows the PRP-RKA adversary A access
to related-key oracles and make queries of the form (φ, x) where φ denotes a
related-key deriving function φ : K → K, φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ D. When the inverse of
g is available, then PRP-(RK)CCA can be similarly defined [1].
In the security notion against key-recovery attacks (KR), adversary A gets or-
acle access to function g which is a random instance of cipher EK for a randomly
selected key K, and who has to guess K. His advantage is then:
AdvKRE (A) = Pr[K
$
← K : AEK(·) = K].
E is secure against key-recovery attacks (KR) if AdvKRE (A) is negligible. Similar
extensions can be done for KR-RKA.
3 Security of Existing PRP-RKA Block Ciphers
Key-recovery attacks can be captured into a key-recovery security (KR) or a pseu-
dorandomness (PRP) notion. In [4], it was shown that the advantage AdvKRE (A)
of any KR adversary mounting a generic attack is expressed in terms of the num-
ber of verifications t for each key guess, thus a function of exhaustive key search:
AdvKRE (A) ≤
t
2k
+
1
2k − t
.
This bounds the adversary’s advantage, i.e. it remains negligible as long as t≪
2k. Thus, the best that can be done is exhaustive key search attack on E.
In [13], it was similarly shown that the advantage AdvKR-RKAΦ,E (A) of any KR-
RKA adversary mounting a generic related-key attack is as follows:
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E (A) ≤
mt
2k
+
1
2k
,
where m is the number of text queries to the E oracle.
In [7] it was shown that for a k+2n-bit keyK = 〈K1,K2,K3〉 whereK1,K3 ∈
{0, 1}n and K2 ∈ {0, 1}
k, the PRP advantage against DESX is:
AdvPRPDESX(A) ≤
2mt
2k+n
.
Thus the best a generic adversary can do is exhaustive search over the keyspace
of the first or last two key components of K in a meet-in-the-middle style.
3.1 Bellare-Kohno Block Cipher
Bellare and Kohno presented a PRP-RKA secure block cipher that is essen-
tially a generalization of the 2-key variant of DES-EXE [11] structure, i.e. C =
EK1(EK1(P ) ⊕ K2), where the EK(·) is not DES-EXE but any block cipher.
This cipher is in fact the first known block cipher with provable security against
RKA. We state the theorem in [1].
Theorem 1 ([1]). Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher, E′ :
{0, 1}k+l×{0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be the block cipher defined as E′
K1||K2
(P ) = EK1(EK1
(P ) ⊕ K2) where K1 is k-bits and K2 is l-bits long. Let Φ be any set of RKD
functions over {0, 1}k+l that modify only K2 and that are independent of K1.
Then if E is secure, E′ is secure with respect to Φ-restricted related-key attacks.
Formally, for any adversary A against E′ that queries its related-key oracle with
at most r different RKD transformations and at most q times per transformation,
we can construct an adversary BA against E such that
AdvPRP-RKAΦ,E′ (A) ≤ Adv
PRP
E (BA) +
16r2q2 + rq′(q′ − 1)
2l+1
and BA makes 2rq oracle queries and runs same time as A and q
′ is q times the
maximum over all K,K ′ ∈ {0, 1}k+l of the number of φ ∈ Φ mapping K to K ′.
Note that the security result above provides guarantees that the pseudorandom-
ness of the Bellare-Kohno cipher E′ with respect to related-key attacks (PRP-
RKA), is only as much as can be obtained in terms of pseudorandomness under
non-related-key attacks (PRP) for the underlying regular cipher E. Nothing more
is claimed. Indeed, this is the minimal requirement for a provably secure con-
struction, i.e. at the worst case it should still be as secure as its underlying
primitive. PRP-RKA security of this cipher as proven in [1, Theorem 1] comes
with a restriction that the set of RKD functions Φ defining an RKA adversary
only modifies the second part of the key i.e. K2. This is a weaker notion of RKA
security compared to previous work [5, 6, 12] where no such restriction is made
on the key but that any part of the key is allowed to vary. Since the key K1
to the underlying cipher E is not allowed to vary, then E will not be subjected
to related-key attacks, thus the result in Theorem 1 above is quite intuitive. In
fact, this is saying that if we have a cipher E such that we do not wish to allow
an adversary to vary the key of E, we construct another cipher E′ from E such
that we now allow the adversary to vary some part of the key but yet the key to
E still cannot be varied. All existing PRP-RKA ciphers use this approach.
With DES-EXE like structure, one wonders if existing attacks [11, 3] on DES-
EXE apply to this variant. We answer in the affirmative. First, we give a meet-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack that does not require related-key queries, then we
give a differential RKA that requires effort slightly less than the first attack.
MITM Attack.
1. Obtain the ciphertexts C,C ′ of P, P ′ under key K = (K1,K2).
2. Guess all 2k values of K1 and compute
S1 = EK1(P )⊕ EK1(P
′) (1)
S2 = E
−1
K1
(C)⊕ E−1K1 (C
′). (2)
Check if S1 = S2. This happens with a probability of 2
−l, leaving 2k × 2−l
remaining values of K1. When k ≤ l, e.g. for DES-EXE k = 56, l = 64, then
only the correct value of K1 remains.
3. Guess all 2l values of K2 and do trial encryption on P, P
′ to check for C,C ′,
EK1(EK1(P )⊕K2) = C (3)
EK1(EK1(P
′)⊕K2) = C
′. (4)
Each equation gives a match with probability 2−l; meaning 2l×2−l×2−l ≈ 0
wrong values thus only the correct value of K2 remains.
Step 1 requires 2 known plaintexts (KPs), Step 2 2k × 4 encryptions EK , and
Step 3 2l × 4 encryptions EK . To summarize, this attack requires 2 KPs, no
memory and 22(2k+2l) encryptions EK . This is much less effort than exhaustive
search of 2k+l encryptions and shows that the 2-key DES-EXE like Bellare-Kohno
block cipher is not much better than double encryption e.g. double DES in the
sense that it effectively offers security against key-recovery attacks comparable
to single encryption. Remark that if we consider a 2-key variant of DESX i.e.
C = EK2(P ⊕K1)⊕K1 it fares slightly better (see Section 3.3).
Recalling the results in [4], any block cipher E′ of key length k + l bits is
expected to provide the following security level:
AdvKRE′ (A) ≤
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l − t
,
and similarly for any block cipher E of key length k bits, it should be that
AdvKRE (A) ≤
t
2k
+
1
2k − t
.
Interestingly, the above attack shows that for E′ it is in fact
AdvKRE′ (A) =
t
22(2k + 2l)
>
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l − t
.
Thus the Bellare-Kohno cipher is less secure than expected for any block cipher
of its key length of k + l bits. Furthermore for this case, we have
AdvKRE′ (A) =
t
22(2k + 2l)
≃
t
2k
+
1
2k − t
,
meaning that AdvKRE′ (A) matches (within a constant factor of) the upper bound
of AdvKRE (A). Thus E
′ with a k + l bit key is not substantially more secure
against k-bit key-recovery attacks than its underlying E of only k bits.
Differential RKA Attack.
1. Obtain the ciphertexts C,C ′ of P, P ′ under keys K = (K1,K2) and K
′ =
(K1,K2 ⊕△) respectively.
2. Guess all 2k values of K1 and check if
E−1K1 (C)⊕ E
−1
K1
(C ′) = △, (5)
with a probability of 2−l, leaving 2k × 2−l remaining values of K1. When
k ≤ l, i.e. for DES-EXE k = 56, l = 64 only the correct value of K1 remains.
3. Guess all 2l values of K2 and do trial encryption on P, P
′ to check for C,C ′,
EK1(EK1(P )⊕K2) = C (6)
EK1(EK1(P
′)⊕ (K2 ⊕△)) = C
′. (7)
Each equation gives a match with probability 2−l; meaning 2l×2−l×2−l ≈ 0
wrong values thus only the correct value of K2 remains.
Step 1 requires 2 related-key known plaintexts (RK-KPs). Step 2 requires 2k×2
encryptions EK . Step 3 requires 2
l × 4 encryptions EK . To summarize, this
attack requires 2 RK-KPs, no memory and 2× 2k+4× 2l encryptions EK . This
RKA effort is slightly less than the MITM attack and thus works better on the
Bellare-Kohno block cipher. But allowing RKAs does not incur much difference
from a MITM attack; the gain is only by a small factor.
Recalling the results in [13], any block cipher E′ of key length k + l bits is
expected to provide the following security against generic related-key attacks:
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E′ (A) ≤
mt
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
,
and similarly for any block cipher E of key length k bits, it should be that
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E (A) ≤
mt
2k
+
1
2k
,
Interestingly, the above attack shows that for E′ it is in fact
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E′ (A) =
t
2(2k) + 22(2l)
>
mt
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
.
This implies that the Bellare-Kohno cipher is less secure than expected for any
block cipher of its key length of k + l bits. We also have:
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E′ (A) =
t
2(2k) + 22(2l)
≃
mt
2k
+
1
2k
,
i.e. AdvKR-RKAΦ,E′ (A) matches (within a constant factor of) the upper bound of
AdvKR-RKAΦ,E (A) and even Adv
KR
E (A). So E
′ with a k+ l bit key is no more secure
against k-bit key-recovery attacks than its underlying E of k bits.
These results show that a block cipher construction like the Bellare-Kohno
which was specifically designed for provable security against RKA, does not
have optimal key-recovery resilience. This is in fact inherited from its DESX-like
structure. Further, one can argue that if in the presence of related-key oracles
E′ should at least be as secure as E, then in the absence of related-key oracles
E′ should be substantially more secure than E.
3.2 Lucks Block Cipher
Lucks [9] argued that Theorem 1 in [1] only applies for large l but for prac-
tical values of l the PRP-RKA advantage is significantly higher than the PRP
advantage. He proposed a construction with a more meaningful security bound.
Theorem 2 ([9]). Let E : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. Let
E′ : {0, 1}2l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be the block cipher defined as E′(K1,K2)(P ) =
EEK1 (K2)(P ) where K1 is l-bits long and K2 is l-bits long. Let K
∗ = {0, 1}2l, Φ
a collision-free set of partial transformations. A is a Φ-restricted adversary for
E′. Count the transformations in A-queries by r = |{φ ∈ Φ | ∃ query (φ, ·)}|.
Then a chosen plaintext adversary BA for E exists, making no more oracle
queries than A, with the same running time as A and the advantage
Adv
PRP-RKA
Φ,E′
(A)
r+1 ≤ Adv
PRP
E (BA).
The encryption of key K2 is the final secret key to encrypt the plaintext P , i.e.
C = EEK1 (K2)(P ). Further, the RKA adversary is only be allowed to vary K2
and not K1. Note that although a 2l-bit key (K1,K2) is used, essentially the
adversary just needs to recover the final secret key EK1(K2) that is used to key
the encryption of P , thus effectively the key length is just l bits. The difference
with this way to generate the final secret key EK1(K2) is that it is no longer easy
for the adversary to control the key difference into the encryption of P since this
key is the output of a block cipher E. Thus we have
AdvKRE′ (A) = Adv
KR
E (A) ≤
t
2k
+
1
2k − t
,
security of E′ against key-recovery attacks is exactly equal to its underlying E.
3.3 Kim et al. Block Cipher
Kim et al. [8] gave a provably secure cipher claimed to be the most efficient to
date, compared with previous cipher in [1, 9]; efficient in the sense that only one
call to the underlying E.
Theorem 3 ([8]). Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher, let
H : {0, 1}t × {0, 1}h → {0, 1}l be an ǫ-almost 2-xor universal (ǫ-AXU2) family
with ǫ ≥ 1|l| and let E
′ : {0, 1}k+t+h × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be another permuta-
tion family defined as E′K,T,h(P ) = EK(P ⊕ h(T )) ⊕ h(T ) where (K,T, h) is
a secret key in {0, 1}k × {0, 1}t × {0, 1}h, and P ∈ {0, 1}l. If E is PRP-CCA
secure and H is ǫ-AXU2 where ǫ is negligible, then E
′ is a secure PRP-CCA
with respect to Φ-restricted RKAs (PRP-CCRKA) when each function φ ∈ Φ is
a partial transformation for which there exists a function φ′ : T → T such
that φ(K,T, h) = (K,φ′(T ), h). Formally, given a PRP-CCRKA adversary A at-
tacking E′ that queries its oracles with at most q queries, we can construct a
PRP-CCA adversary BA attacking E which takes the same amount of time and
makes the same number of oracle queries as A such that
AdvPRP-CCRKAΦ,E′ (A) ≤ Adv
PRP-CCA
E (BA) + 3ǫq
2.
Recall that DESX [7] is defined as:
DESX(x,K1||K||K2) = K2 ⊕ EK(x⊕K1)
where K1 and K2 are the pre- and post-whitening keys respectively, and K is
to key the inner E encapsulated by the two outer whitening (XOR) operations.
The basic structure of this Kim et al. block cipher is like DESX [7] except that
the pre- and post-whitening keys equal each other and is the result of applying
an ǫ-AXU2 hash function h to the input tweak T :
K1 = K2 = h(T ).
In other words, this construction can be viewed as 2-key DESX where the secret
key is equivalently K and h(T ), thus the total key length is |K|+ |h(T )|.
There is a restriction attached to this construction as well. Namely, the key
K to EK(·) cannot be varied by an RKA adversary; only T is allowed to vary.
The security claim is based on this, i.e. even if the RKA adversary can vary
the tweak input T , he cannot predict what the key difference is to the pre- and
post-whitening parts since the hash function h is ǫ-AXU2.
MITM Attack. The advanced slide attack [2] was applied to DESX and is
basically a MITM attack. We show that a variant of the attack also applies to
the Kim et al. block cipher. First we make some observations. Consider aligning
an encryption with a decryption, slid on the post XOR. Thus for such a slid pair
〈P,C〉 and 〈P ′, C ′〉 we get C ⊕ C ′ = h(T ) and therefore
P ′ = h(T )⊕ E−1K (C
′ ⊕ h(T )) = h(T )⊕ E−1K (C) (8)
P = h(T )⊕ E−1K (C
′). (9)
Combining, we get
E−1K (C)⊕ P = E
−1
K (C
′)⊕ P ′. (10)
1. Obtain 2
l+1
2 known plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts 〈Pi, Ci〉.
2. Guess all 2k values of K and do
(a) Insert 〈E−1K (Ci)⊕ Pi, i〉 into a hash table keyed by the first component.
(b) For each i 6= j with E−1K (Ci)⊕ Pi = E
−1
K (Cj)⊕ Pj , do
i. h(T ) = C ⊕ C ′.
ii. Test 〈h(T ),K〉 via trial encryption on a few known 〈Pi, Ci〉.
Step 1 requires 2
l+1
2 known plaintexts (KPs), Step 2(a) 2k×2
l+1
2 encryptions EK ;
Step 2(b) is only performed for a slid pair, and for each this requires O(1) encryp-
tions EK . It is expected that only 2
k× 2l× 2−l = 2k slid pairs are detected thus
about 2k EK . To summarize, the attack requires 2
l+1
2 known plaintexts (KPs),
2
l+1
2 memory and 2k × 2
l+1
2 encryptions EK ; compared to 2
k+l for exhaustive
key search. This above attack therefore shows that for E′ it is in fact
AdvKRE′ (A) =
t
2k + 2
l+1
2
>
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l − t
;
it is less secure than expected for any block cipher of its k + l bits key length.
Furthermore, hence AdvKRE′ (A) matches (within a constant factor of) the upper
bound of AdvKRE (A) thus E
′ with a k+ l bit key is not substantially more secure
against k-bit key-recovery attacks than its underlying E of k bits.
AdvKRE′ (A) =
t
2k + 2
l+1
2
≃
t
2k
+
1
2k − t
,
Resistance against RKA. On the positive side, it appears that the Kim et
al. block cipher resists differential RKA since the key K to the inner EK is not
allowed to vary and although T is allowed to vary, the actual key difference due
to h(T ) cannot be predicted.
4 An Open Problem
All existing PRP-RKA ciphers do not allow the key component of the underlying
cipher E to be varied. It is an open problem if PRP-RKA ciphers exist that allows
this.
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